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		OOCKETING INFOR			y) n's Agenda expeditiously
INDUSTRY (C	heck one)	NATU	RE OF ACTION	(Check all tha	at apply)
☐ Electric		Affidavit	Letter		Request
☐ Electric/Gas		Agreement	Memorandum		Request for Certificatio
☐ Electric/Telecon	nmunications	Answer	Motion		Request for Investigation
☐ Electric/Water		Appellate Review	Objection		Resale Agreement
☐ Electric/Water/T	elecom.	☐ Application	Petition		Resale Amendment
Electric/Water/S	ewer	Brief	Petition for Re	consideration	Reservation Letter
Gas		Certificate	Petition for Ru	lemaking	Response
Railroad		Comments	Petition for Rule	to Show Cause	Response to Discovery
Sewer		Complaint	Petition to Inte	rvene	Return to Petition
	tions	Consent Order	Petition to Interv	ene Out of Time	Stipulation
☐ Transportation		Discovery	Prefiled Testim	nony	Subpoena
Water		Exhibit	Promotion		☐ Tariff
Water/Sewer		Expedited Consideration	Proposed Orde	r	Other:
Administrative N	Matter	Interconnection Agreement	Protest		
Other:		Interconnection Amendment	Dublisher's Aff	īdavit	
		Late-Filed Exhibit	Report		

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION OF)	
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY	j	
L.P. AND SPRINT SPECTRUM L. P.)	Docket No 2007-215-C
D/B/A SPRINT PCS FOR ARBITRATION)	20000110 2007 213-C
OF RATES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS)	
OF INTERCONNECTION WITH	í	
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS,	j –	
INC. D/B/A AT&T SOUTH CAROLINA)	
D/B/A AT&T SOUTHEAST	j	

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MARK G. FELTON FILED JULY 30, 2007

1	I.	INTRODUCTION
2		
3	Q.	Please state your name, business address, employer and current position.
4		
5	A.	My name is Mark G. Felton. My business address is 6330 Sprint Parkway,
6		Overland Park, KS 66251. I am employed as a Contracts Negotiator III in the
7		Access Solutions group of Sprint United Management, the management
8		subsidiary of Sprint Nextel Corporation ("Sprint Nextel").
9		
10	Q.	On whose behalf are you testifying?
11		
12	A.	I am testifying on behalf of Sprint Communications Company L.P. ("Sprint
13		CLEC") and Sprint Spectrum L.P. d/b/a Sprint PCS ("Sprint PCS"). I refer to
14		Sprint CLEC and Sprint PCS collectively in my testimony as "Sprint."
15		
16	Q.	Are you the same Mark G. Felton who filed Direct Testimony in this
17		proceeding on July 9, 2007?
18		
19	A.	Yes, I am.
20		
21	Q.	What is the purpose of your Rebuttal Testimony?
22		

l	A.	The purpose of my Rebuttal Testimony is to respond to the Direct Testimony of
2		BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. d/b/a AT&T South Carolina d/b/a AT&T
3		Southeast ("AT&T") witnesses, P. L. (Scot) Ferguson and J. Scott McPhee. ¹
1		First I will address the characterization of the parties' negotiations made by both
5		AT&T witnesses. Next I will address each AT&T witness's references to the
5		appropriate jurisdiction over the Merger Commitments. Finally, I will separately
7		respond to unique items in each AT&T witness's testimony.

II. NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE SPRINT'S MARCH 20, 2007 EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT TO ACCEPT AT&T'S OFFER OF A 3-YEAR EXTENSION OF THE 2001 ICA.

Q. Please comment on Mr. Ferguson's assertion that Sprint "stopped working towards entering into a new negotiated interconnection agreement" (SF, page 6, lines 22-23).

A. Sprint has never stopped working towards an interconnection agreement with
AT&T that addresses Sprint's business needs. The parties' negotiations did
indeed expand, however, to include Sprint evaluating the benefits of extending
the term of its current month-to-month interconnection agreement ("ICA") with
AT&T. This expansion of the negotiations occurred as a result of AT&T's

¹ References are cited to the "AT&T Direct Testimony of P.L. (Scot) Ferguson Before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2007-215-C, July 23, 2007" as (SF page _, lines _), to the "AT&T Direct Testimony of J. Scott McPhee Before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2007-215-C, July 23, 2007" as (JSM page _, lines _), and to my prior "Prefiled Direct Testimony of Mark G. Felton Filed July 9, 2007" as (MGF page _, lines _).

offering such an extension to any telecommunications provider, including Sprint, via the Merger Commitments. Mr. Ferguson clearly demonstrates his lack of first-hand knowledge of the negotiations by suggesting this shift occurred in late 2006. In fact, the parties began exploring the effect of the Merger Commitments within their ongoing negotiations in early 2007 and it was not until March 20, 2007, after AT&T disengaged from substantive communications, that Sprint informed AT&T of its intention to extend its current agreement.

Q. How do you respond to Mr. McPhee's statement that "Sprint broke off negotiations for a successor agreement in December 2006, after reaching agreement in principle on outstanding issues" (JSM page 6, lines 17-19)?

A.

Mr. McPhee's statement is inaccurate, misleading and is evidence of his unfamiliarity with the AT&T / Sprint negotiations. First, Sprint did not and, to date, has not "broken off" negotiations with AT&T. To the contrary, Sprint has proactively maintained an open dialogue with AT&T to explore all options for resolution of this issue. Second, while Mr. McPhee is correct that the parties did reach agreement on "some" outstanding issues, he conveniently omits the word "all." In fact, as I stated in my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony at page 9, the parties continued to struggle with a few critical issues and it was unclear at best whether final resolution would be reached. Consequently, when the Merger Commitments were offered by AT&T and accepted by the FCC, it was

incumbent upon Sprint to consider them within the context of the open negotiations.

Q. What happened after December 29, 2006?

A.

After the FCC approved the AT&T/BellSouth Merger on December 29, 2006 subject to the Merger Commitments, on Wednesday January 3, 2007, the parties immediately discussed the impact of the Merger Commitments on the pending negotiations. Based on that call, Sprint submitted written Merger Commitment-related questions later the same day. The very first question asked for AT&T's "Confirmation that Sprint may extend its 2001 ICA (which is currently on a month-to-month term) for up to three years?" On January 10, 2007, AT&T negotiator Lynn Allen-Flood advised Sprint by e-mail that:

"BellSouth is working to get answers to these questions The answer to Sprint's main question is that Sprint <u>can</u> extend the 2001 ICA, however, I do not yet have all the details to fully respond. Considering this, BellSouth proposes to extend the arbitration close by two weeks and the associated letter is attached for your confirmation." [Emphasis in original.]

Ms. Allen-Flood's e-mail is consistent with Mr. Ferguson's testimony that AT&T agrees this commitment allows Sprint to extend the term of its current ICA for three years. Mr. Ferguson then correctly points out that the heart of the dispute is over the date from which the extension begins (SF page 11, lines 9-16); however, it is apparent to Sprint that AT&T seeks to renege on its commitment to extend any agreement, regardless of whether the initial term has expired, through an interpretation of the Merger Commitment that is beyond any

reasonable explanation, the end result of which is a "modified" offer of a less than 1-year post-merger extension of Sprint's current month-to-month term ICA.

Q. Can you summarize Sprint's efforts to pursue further negotiations between January 10, 2007 and the sending of Sprint's March 20, 2007 letter exercising Sprint's right to accept AT&T's Merger Commitment offer to extend the 2001 ICA 3-years, Petition Exhibit C?

Yes. The parties extended the then-existing arbitration "windows" for the 9

AT&T states not once, but twice, to provide additional time to consider the

Merger Commitments in the context of the parties' negotiations. The first

extension was a couple of weeks to early February at AT&T's suggestion per Ms.

Allen-Flood's previously mentioned e-mail, followed by a longer extension

(Petition Exhibit A) that resulted in the first arbitration window opening in late

March.

As of February 1, 2007, considering AT&T's January 10, 2007 response that Sprint could extend its 2001 ICA but AT&T had still not yet responded to all of Sprint's Merger Commitment related questions, Sprint made a good-faith settlement offer. Sprint followed up on February 5th and requested a meeting to discuss Sprint's offer. On February 7th AT&T responded that such a meeting would be "premature." On February 14th, Sprint again requested a meeting no

later than February 23rd to discuss any further AT&T response to Sprint's Merger Commitment-related questions and Sprint's February 1st settlement offer.

On February 21st, after having Sprint's settlement offer 3 weeks, AT&T advised that it was "surprised" by Sprint's settlement offer and any substantive response AT&T could provide at this time would not meet with Sprint's approval. AT&T proposed an additional 60-day extension to the arbitration widows so that the first window would close June 16 and requested a call the week of March 5th - but further added AT&T would not have any substantive response to Sprint's February 1st settlement discussion document *until mid April*. On March 7th, AT&T further clarified that its offer for a call the week of March 5th was to let Sprint know AT&T was glad to meet but acknowledged that there was nothing more to share at that point from AT&T.

As far as Sprint is concerned, it was AT&T that chose to disengage from negotiations altogether and pursue a course of delay and non-compliance. In light of the overall 42-month Merger Commitment limitation period, Sprint had, and continues to have, legitimate concerns regarding what impact such AT&T delays and non-compliance may ultimately reek upon Sprint's efforts to timely implement its rights to a full 3-year extension. Sprint was simply not willing to leave it to AT&T to further delay negotiations, while the 42-month Merger Commitment limitation period continued to run. Accordingly, Sprint sent its

March 20, 2007 letter accepting a 3-year extension of the parties' 2001 ICA and stating the parties' disputed positions regarding the 3-year ICA extension commencement date (Petition Exhibit C).

4

5 III. AT&T WITNESSES' REFERENCES TO FCC JURISDICTION OVER THE MERGER COMMITMENTS.

7 8

9

10

11

Q. Messrs. Ferguson and McPhee address the issue of the South Carolina Commission's jurisdiction in this case, stating that the "issue can only be addressed by the FCC" (SF, page 3, line 14, JSM, page 4, lines 14-15) and that the issue is not "an appropriate issue for a 252 arbitration proceeding" (JSM, page 4, lines 13-14). Do you agree?

13

12

14 No. While I am not an attorney and will not offer a legal opinion here, I know A. that Sprint's position is that this Commission has jurisdiction in this matter as 15 16 evidenced by Sprint's arbitration filing. In addition, Sprint filed its response to AT&T's Motion to Dismiss on July 2, 2007, and therein clearly articulated the 17 18 legal basis for this Commission's jurisdiction to address AT&T's merger-related 19 interconnection obligations. Furthermore, this issue squarely addresses one of 20 the most fundamental aspects of contract negotiations - the term of the agreement - and it is my belief that Congress, through the Telecommunications 21 Act of 1996, granted this Commission the authority make a determination in this 22 23 instance.

24

1	IV.	REBUTTAL TO THE BALANCE OF MR. FERGUSON'S TESTIMONY
2		
3	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Ferguson regarding what Merger Commitment is at
4		issue in this docket, or the source and purpose of that Merger Commitment?
5		
6	A.	Yes, we agree that the Merger Commitment at issue is the one identified as
7		"Reducing Transaction Costs Associated with Interconnection Agreements"
8		paragraph 4. (Cf. MGF page 10, line 20 through page 11, line 3 and SF page 7,
9		line 14 through page 8, line 5.) I do not dispute that the cable companies were
10		the source of Merger Commitment No. 4, or that Merger Commitment No. 4
11		contemplates the "exten[sion of] the term of existing agreements" (SF page 8,
12		line 7 through page 9, line 22).
13		
14	Q.	Where do you and Mr. Ferguson part ways?
15		
16	A.	We apparently disagree over the meaning of the words "term" and "existing
17		agreements." Mr. Ferguson states "Sprint's ICA expired on December 31, 2004"
18		(SF page 5, lines 8-9), and then, in response to the question "What is an
19		expiration date of an interconnection agreement?," asserts:
20 21 22		An ICA expiration date is an agreed-upon date certain that defines the termination of an ICA between two companies.

(SF page 6, lines 10-14.) Mr. Ferguson also suggests that the parties *only* continued to operate under the 2001 ICA by virtue of AT&T's:

"longstanding practice ... that, if the negotiation or arbitration of a new interconnection agreement continues beyond the expiration date of the existing interconnection agreement, the parties can agree to extend negotiations for the new interconnection agreement beyond the expiration date."

(SF page 5, lines 6-10, emphasis added.) Based on the foregoing, I believe Mr. Ferguson's testimony creates two erroneous impressions. First, he implies that under the ICA *only* a stated fixed multi-month or multi-year time period constitutes a "term" that is subject to the 3-year extension and, second, that the ICA *only* continues past a fixed term expiration if the parties are in negotiations and agree to extend such negotiations beyond the fixed-term expiration date.

The problem with Mr. Ferguson's position is that it ignores the additional 2001 ICA provisions where the parties not only expressly agreed in writing that the "term" *automatically* becomes a month-to-month term after a fixed term "expiration," but the process by which a new month-to-month "term" is either replaced or terminated. The conversion to a month-to-month term is automatic under the last sentence of Section 2.1. (*See* Exhibit MGF-1 of my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony): "If, as of the expiration of this Agreement, a Subsequent Agreement has not been executed by the Parties, this Agreement shall continue on a month-to-month basis"; see also legacy BellSouth counsel's admission in Exhibit MGF-2 to my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony. The month-to-month term

can literally continue without termination if neither party sends a 60-day termination notice as provided in Section 3.3. (See Exhibit MGF-1 of my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony). And, if there is any doubt that the month-to-month constitutes an "extension," ICA Section 3.4 also states that when an arbitration is filed and the Commission has not ruled prior to an expiration of the ICA, the ICA "is deemed extended on a month-to-month basis" (See Exhibit MGF-1 of my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony.) Simply stated, "evergreen" provisions are common in ICAs and the presence of this type of provision in the AT&T / Sprint ICA should not be used to Sprint's detriment.

Q. What is the effect on AT&T's position once it is understood that upon termination of the 2001 ICA's fixed term, the ICA automatically converted to a month-to-month term?

A.

Pursuant to Merger Condition No. 4, AT&T is required to extend Sprint's "current" ICA for a period up to 3-years. Despite Mr. Ferguson's assertion that "the parties have continued under that prior interconnection agreement as an interim measure to accommodate on-going negotiations" (SF page 12, lines 19-21), as I clearly explained above, Sprint's "current" ICA continues on a month-to-month basis by operation of the ICA's own terms. The month-to-month ICA is clearly the "current" ICA that Sprint is entitled to extend for 3 years. I don't see any significance under either the ICA or Merger Condition No. 4 to the

1		December 2004 fixed term expiration relied upon by Mr. Ferguson. Indeed, the
2		ICA is the current, ongoing agreement with an active month-to-month term, that
3		has been amended five times since December 2004, the most recent amendment
4		occurring in October 2006. (See Exhibit MGF-1 of my July 9, 2007 Direct
5		Testimony.) Certainly, parties would not expend significant time and energy to
6		repeatedly amend an agreement unless those parties consider such agreement to
7		be the "current" agreement under which they operate.
8		
9	Q.	What is your response to Mr. Ferguson's assertions that Sprint is seeking a
10		"six year" extension (SF page 14, lines 7-8), that Sprint's interpretation is
11		unfair and leads to discriminatory treatment based on timing (see generally,
12		SF page 15, line 4-9)?
13		
14	A.	First, Sprint's interpretation results in the same treatment for all carriers – a post
15		December 29, 2006 3-year extension of a carrier's "current" ICA. This
16		interpretation is based on a straightforward application of Merger Commitment
17		No. 4 and the unequivocal language of the FCC order that states:
18 19 20 21 22 23		For the avoidance of doubt, unless otherwise expressly stated to the contrary, all conditions and commitments proposed apply in the AT&T/BellSouth in-region territory for a period of forty-two months <i>from the Merger Closing Date</i> and would automatically sunset thereafter.
24		(MGF page 10, lines 10-18, emphasis added.)

Second, Sprint has consistently operated in good faith with respect to AT&T and cannot be responsible for AT&T's "concern" that other carriers may attempt to drag their feet to obtain a longer extension. The reality is that if AT&T believes a given carrier is not negotiating in good faith, AT&T has always had, and continues to have, the power to either initiate arbitration itself or refuse an extension with a given carrier - which in and of itself places significant pressure upon carriers to act in good faith in the first place.

Third, it is truly ironic that AT&T would point to Sprint's desire to keep its ICA in place as somehow unfair because Sprint would obtain a longer benefit than some other hypothetical carrier. AT&T knows full well that the parties have invested an incredible amount of time in repeatedly amending the 2001 ICA to keep it current. Mr. Ferguson's assertion that Sprint's interpretation of a 3-year extension ignores "the transactional costs associated with the negotiations that have taken place over the last two-and-a-half years" (SF page 17, lines 16-18) again demonstrates his lack of familiarity with the ICA and the negotiations that occurred. A significant amount of such transaction costs were actually sunk into the *six amendments* that the parties did enter into over the last two-and-a-half years since the initiation of negotiations. (*See* Exhibit MGF-1 of my July 9, 2007 Direct Testimony.) Any "unfairness" in this case does not arise by virtue of Sprint wanting to keep in place an ICA in which it has already invested years in keeping up-to-date. The real unfairness here is in AT&T making an unqualified

3-year extension offer to the FCC and the industry, apparently thinking twice about what it did after the fact, and now searching high and low for a way to avoid extending Sprint's ICA. From Sprint's perspective as a competing carrier, there are indeed significant *avoidable* transaction cost opportunities that the Merger Commitments represent to Sprint by continued use of the 2001 ICA, and AT&T is simply seeking to prevent Sprint from realizing such benefits.

And finally, with respect to the example AT&T provided as to why the 2001 ICA is out-of-date – i.e., because AT&T has developed a purported methodology to accurately measure and jurisdictionalize interMTA traffic (SF page 16, lines 3-9) – Mr. Ferguson once again demonstrates his lack of familiarity with both the negotiations and the 2001 ICA. The parties did not agree on any specific "methodology" for jurisdictionalizing traffic, and Sprint continues to dispute AT&T's purported ability to "accurately" identify and measure interMTA traffic. What the parties contemplated was insertion of newly "negotiated" interMTA factors and the need to develop a process (requiring mutual agreement) for periodically updating such factors. Absent such mutual agreement, interMTA factors were still subject to resolution pursuant to the ICA's dispute resolution provisions – as would be any dispute under the 2001 ICA.

V. REBUTTAL TO THE BALANCE OF MR. MCPHEE'S TESTIMONY

1 Q. How do you respond to Mr. McPhee's request that the Commission impose
2 upon Sprint "the language that AT&T believes to be the final agreement the
3 parties had reached through negotiations for the General Terms and
4 Conditions and all attachments except Attachment 3" and "with regard to
5 Attachment 3" impose AT&T's "standard Attachment 3 for interconnection
6 services" (JSM page 5, line 11-16)?

A.

Mr. McPhee is seeking this Commission's complicity in AT&T breaching its interconnection obligations under the Merger Commitments, in addition to punishing Sprint for daring to accept an offer that AT&T voluntarily proposed and has since become obligated to make to all carriers in the industry. AT&T's request makes about as much sense as Sprint requesting the Commission impose upon AT&T "the language that *Sprint* believes to be the final agreement the parties had reached through negotiations for the General Terms and Conditions and all attachments except Attachment 3" and "with respect to Attachment 3" impose Attachment 3 from the parties 2001 ICA. Neither suggestion is warranted and, in any event, Sprint has already accepted the 3-year extension of the 2001 ICA which AT&T acknowledged in writing Sprint was entitled to do.

Q. Why should the Commission rule in Sprint's favor on Issue 1 and simultaneously reject AT&T's proposed "Issue 2?"

First, it is truly absurd that Mr. McPhee asserts AT&T's proposed resolution is "completely compliant with the merger commitments AT&T made to the FCC."

Nothing could be further from reality. Among other things, the Merger Commitments now require AT&T to negotiate from the parties' existing ICA – which is precisely what Sprint repeatedly requested of AT&T throughout negotiations and AT&T repeatedly refused. More to the point in this case, the Merger Commitments require a 3-year extension of the parties' "current" ICA, which a "proposed agreement" is, by definition, *not*.

A.

Second, AT&T even admits it "has offered to extend [Sprint's] interconnection agreement three years" (SF page 16, lines 19-20). The only dispute with respect to such an extension is over the commencement date: AT&T sought to limit Sprint's 3-year extension by construing any commencement date to be "from the ICA expiration date of December 31, 2004," and Sprint contends it is entitled to a post-merger, full 3-year extension from no earlier than the December 29, 2006 approval date. It is the current month-to-month term nature of the Sprint ICA that supports the actual extension occurring from the date of Sprint's request, because the month in which the request is made constitutes the "current' ICA time-frame that is being extended for the full, post-merger 3-year period.

Third, Sprint's interpretation is supported by the language of the Merger Commitments, is reasonable, and accomplishes the spirit of the Merger

Commitments.

Fourth, as previously explained in my Direct Testimony, on its face, AT&T's position would require the Commission to ignore two simple facts. First, the parties' current ICA is by its express terms "deemed extended" and, therefore, is still in effect with a rolling month-to-month expiration date that automatically continues to extend and renew. And second, AT&T's interpretation requires the Commission to apply the Merger Commitments in a manner inconsistent with their express terms in order to essentially "back date" their application to precede their express stated effective date of December 29, 2006. The practical effect of accepting AT&T's position is that the Commission must essentially re-write Merger Commitment No. 4 and the FCC's Order in a manner that obliterates the clear intended benefit to requesting carriers of a post-Merger Closing Date three-year ICA extension, which will only serve to reward and encourage further AT&T breaches of its legal obligations.

17 Q. Does this conclude your Rebuttal Testimony?

18 A. Yes.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF KANSAS

COUNTY OF JOHNSON

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, duly commissioned and qualified in and for the State and County aforesaid, personally came and appeared Mark G. Felton, who being by me first duly sworn deposed and said that:

Mark G. Felton

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE

METHIS 2/1 th

DAVOE

2007

NOTARY PUBLIC

NOTARY PUBLIC -- State of Kansas

MARY K. JOSHI

My Appt Exp. 3 - 5 - 09

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA

PETITION OF SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P. AND SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P. D/B/A SPRINT PCS FOR ARBITRATION OF RATES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF INTERCONNECTION WITH BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. D/B/A AT&T SOUTH CAROLINA D/B/A AT&T SOUTHEAST

Docket No. 2007-215-C

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on July 30, 2007, he served a copy of the attached **Rebuttal Testimony of Mark G. Felton Filed July 30, 2007** by first-class mail, proper postage affixed addressed to the person(s) hereinafter named, at the place(s) and address(es) stated below, which is/are the last known address(es):

Patrick W. Turner, Esq. General Counsel-South Carolina BellSouth Telecommunications Legal Department 1600 Williams Street Suite 5200 Columbia, SC 29201

Nanette S. Edwards Office of Regulatory Staff Post Office Box 11263 Columbia, SC 29211

Julie A. Curll, Legal Assistant

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

PO Box 10208

Greenville, SC 29603-0208

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